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DENNY V. ELIZABETHARDEN SALONS, INC.: CONDONING
RACE DISCRIMINATION IN RESEMBLING PLACES OF
PUBLIC ACCOMMODATION UNDER TITLE II
RADIANCE A. WALTERS*
In Denny v. Elizabeth Arden Salons, Inc.,I the Court of Appeals
for the Fourth Circuit considered whether a beauty salon is a "place of
public accommodation," specifically a "place of entertainment," under
Title II of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 [hereinafter "the 1964 Act"].2
The Fourth Circuit held that Title II does not consider a beauty salon
as a "place of entertainment" within the statute's meaning. In its
holding, the court made three errors. First, the court misunderstood its
role under the separation of powers doctrine. 4 Second, the court
strayed from controlling precedent. 5 Lastly, the court's decision
undermined the original motivating purpose behind the enactment of
Title 11.6 As a result, the Fourth Circuit articulated a new, unsupported
rule that will simultaneously allow for future arbitrary decisions in
lower federal courts within the Circuit and possibly beyond, and
continue to perpetuate the legacy of race discrimination in our society.
To prevent such an outcome, the United States Supreme Court should
grant certiorari and reverse the Fourth Circuit's decision.
I. THE CASE
On May 26, 2002, plaintiff Seandria Denny, an African-
American woman, purchased a spa package for her mother, Jean
Denny, at the Red Door Salon and Spa, located in a shopping center in
Tysons Comer, Virginia. 7 The Red Door Salon and Spa is an upscale
beauty salon and day spa with locations in Virginia and other states,
* J.D. Candidate, 2009. University of Maryland School of Law. B.A., English and Religion,
2006. Swarthmore College.
1. Denny v. Elizabeth Arden Salons, Inc., 456 F.3d 427 (4th Cir. 2006).
2. 42 U.S.C. § 2000a (2006); see also Denny, 456 F.3d at 431.
3. See infra Part Ii; Denny, 456 F.3d at 434; 42 U.S.C. § 2000a(b)(3) (2006) ("Each of
the following establishments which serves the public is a place of public accommodation
within the meaning of this title if its operations affect commerce, or if discrimination or
segregation by it is supported by State action ... any motion picture house, theater, concert
hall, sports arena, stadium or other place of exhibition or entertainment ... .
4. See infra Part IV.A.
5. See infra Part IV.B.
6. See infra Part IV.C.
7. Denny, 456 F.3d at 429-30.
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which offers a wide array of beauty services including hair, skin, and
nail care, makeup artistry, massages, and facials. 8
Four days after Seandria Denny's purchase, Jean Denny
arrived at the salon to redeem her gift packaged which included a
massage, facial, manicure, hair styling, and lunch. While Jean Denny
enjoyed her gift package, Seandria Denny called the Red Door Salon
and Spa and requested that a hair coloring service be added to her
mother's spa package.' ° The salon receptionist approved the request
and added the hair coloring service to Jean Denny's spa treatments for
the day. 1
Later that day, Seandria Denny stopped by the salon to check
on her mother and to pay for the additional hair coloring service.
1 2
Upon her arrival, however, Seandria Denny learned that the salon had
not performed the hair coloring service on her mother because the
salon did not "do black people's hair."' 3 According to Seandria Denny,
when she requested that one of the salon's many stylists do her
mother's hair, each stylist had refused.'4
On May 20, 2004, plaintiffs Seandria and Jean Denny brought
suit against Elizabeth Arden Salons, Inc. in the United States District
Court for the Eastern District of Virginia, alleging two incidents of
discrimination under Title II of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and §
1981. 15 In bringing their Title II claim, the plaintiffs argued that the
salon qualified as a "place of entertainment" under § 2000a(b)(3) of
Title 11.16 The district court granted the defendant's motion for
summary judgment on all claims, including the Title II claim. 17
Specifically, the court held that the "place of entertainment" language
of Title II did not apply to salons.' 8 Plaintiffs appealed to the Court of
Appeals for the Fourth Circuit to determine whether a beauty salon is a
8. Id. at 429.




13. Id. In response to this comment, Seandria Denny explained to the receptionist that
her mother's hair was straight and similar to Caucasian hair, but the receptionist insisted that
the salon did not do African-American hair. Id.
14. Id. Salon manager Chelsey Orth, however, had a different recollection of the
incident. Id. She contended that, "[s]ince the hair coloring would have added an hour to Jean
Denny's visit, Orth was unable to include it on such short notice." Id.
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"place of entertainment" and, thus, a "place of public accommodation"
entitled to Title II protection. 19
II. LEGAL BACKGROUND
The history of the 1964 Act reveals that legislative politics,
strategic behavior, and compromise were factors that allowed the 1964
Act to become law and overcome the Jim Crow laws that mandated de
jure segregation throughout the South.20 Relying on this context and
legislative history, federal courts took different approaches in
interpreting the breadth of Title II in the years that followed its
passage.
21
A. Title II of the Civil Rights Act of 1964
Title II of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 provides that "[a]ll
persons shall be entitled to the full and equal enjoyment of the goods,
services, facilities, privileges, advantages, and accommodations of any
place of public accommodation,... without discrimination or
segregation on the ground of race, color, religion, or national origin.'
22
The public accommodations provision in Title II of the 1964 Act
developed from the antiquated 1875 Civil Rights Act, which was
invalidated in the Civil Rights Cases of 1883 when the Supreme Court
found that Congress had no power to prohibit private discrimination in
places of public accommodation. 23  This "places of public
accommodation" language was later incorporated into the 1964 Act.2
4
To avoid the fate of the 1875 Civil Rights Act, the drafters of the 1964
Act linked Title II to the Commerce Clause, thus barring private
business owners from discriminating based on the premise that
discrimination impairs travel and thus affects interstate commerce.
25
19. Id.
20. See discussion infra Part II.B; see also Daniel B. Rodriquez & Barry R. Weingast,
The Positive Political Theory of Legislative History: New Perspectives on the 1964 Civil
Rights Act and Its Interpretation, 151 U. PA. L. REv. 1417, 1537 (2003).
21. See discussion infra Part II.C-D.
22. 42 U.S.C § 2000a(a) (2006).
23. Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 11 (1883) (finding that the Constitution does not
grant Congress the authority to prohibit private discrimination in public accommodations).
24. See id. at 9.
25. Daniel v. Paul, 395 U.S. 298, 301 (1969); Katzenbach v. McClung, 379 U.S. 294,
304 (1964) (affirming the reasoning of Congress in connecting discrimination and interstate
commerce); Public Accommodations on Trial, TIME, Oct. 16, 1964, available at
http://www.time.comltime/magazine/article/0,9171,876252-1,00.html; see 42 U.S.C. §
2000a(b) (2006). See generally infra notes 46-48 and accompanying text.
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Title II includes hotels, restaurants, places of entertainment,
and other entities located within these covered establishments in the
definition of "places of public accommodation." 26 For Title II to apply,
these listed accommodations must affect interstate commerce or,
alternatively, must engage in state-supported activities of
discrimination or segregation. In enacting this statute, Congress
sought to guarantee individuals "the full and equal enjoyment of the
goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, and accommodations
of any place of public accommodation ... ,28 In particular, the
drafters included the "places of public accommodation" provision to
extinguish the blatant and offensive racial barriers that existed at the
time, evident in the clearly segregated facilities that either excluded
African-Americans from participating in certain activities altogether,
or provided a sub-standard version of the facility for African-
Americans to use.
29
26. 42 U.S.C. § 2000a(b) (2006) states that:
Each of the following establishments which serves the public is a place of
public accommodation within the meaning of this title if its operations
affect commerce, or if discrimination or segregation by it is supported by
State action:
(1) any inn, hotel, motel or other establishment which provides lodging to
transient guests, other than an establishment located within a building
which contains not more than five rooms for rent or hire and which is
actually occupied by the proprietor of such establishment as his residence;
(2) any restaurant, cafeteria, lunchroom, lunch counter, soda fountain, or
other facility principally engaged in selling food for consumption on the
premises, including, but not limited to, any such facility located on the
premises of any retail establishment, or any gasoline station;
(3) any motion picture house, theater, concert hall, sports arena, stadium
or other place of exhibition or entertainment; and
(4) any establishment (A)(i) which is physically located within the
premises of any establishment otherwise covered by this subsection, or (ii)
within the premises of which is physically located any such covered
establishment and (B) which holds itself out as serving patrons of such
covered establishment.
Id.; Michael F. Roessler, We are not Amused: The Narrow Interpretation of Title I1's Place-of-
Entertainment Provision in Denny v. Elizabeth Arden Salons, Inc., 85 N.C. L. REV 1259, 1262
(2007).
27. 42 U.S.C. § 2000a(b) (2006).
28. Id.
29. David B. Filvaroff& Raymond E. Wolfmger, The Origin and Enactment of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964, in LEGACIES OF THE 1964 CIVIL RIGHTS ACT 9, 11-13 (Bernard Grofman
ed., 2000); see also Randall Kennedy, The Struggle for Racial Equality in Public
Accommodations, in LEGACIES OF THE 1964 CIVIL RIGHTS ACT 156 (Bernard Grofman ed.,
2000).
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B. Enacting the Legislation
In response to the persistent racial agony that permeated the
nation's social and legal structures, Congress enacted the Civil Rights
Act of 1964.30 Prior to the 1964 Act, Congress passed three Civil
Rights Acts during the Reconstruction period of 1865-1877 and two
others in 1957 and 1960.31 Although some important strides were
made in preserving the civil rights of African-Americans, most of
those Civil Rights Acts did little to eradicate the discrimination that
African-Americans experienced on a daily basis.
32
The turning point in the fight for African-Americans' civil
rights was the 1963 March on Birmingham to protest segregation in
public accommodations throughout the South.33  The peaceful
protesters encountered much violence from the local law enforcement,
and media coverage of this historic event brought the reality of the
South's racial caste system to the forefront of the American psyche.
34
Seeing the impact of this media attention, the Southern Christian
Leadership Conference and allied interest groups, all of whom
preferred a non-violent approach to the fight for civil rights, began an
intense lobbying campaign for federal legislation that addressed the
problem of segregation. Civil rights groups feared that without
legislative action, demonstrations would continue to spread throughout
the South and into the North, perpetuating widespread disruption and
racial violence.
36
30. Kennedy, supra note 29, at 158.
31. Llewellyn E. Thompson, The Civil Rights Act of 1964: Present at Its Birth, 29
U.S.F. L. REV. 681, 682-84 (1995). The Civil Rights Act of 1866 aimed to "guarantee former
slaves equal rights under the law, including the right to make and enforce contracts and certain
other property rights." Id. at 682-83. The Civil Rights Act of 1871 sought to protect southern
African-Americans from the Ku Klux Klan and its sympathizers by providing both a state and
a federal civil remedy for abuses being committed. Id. at 683. The Civil Rights Act of 1875
prohibited racial discrimination in certain public places. Id. The Civil Rights Act of 1957
established a civil rights commission to protect individuals' rights to equal protection and
allowed courts to grant injunctions in support of those rights. Id. at 684. The Civil Rights Act
of 1960 established federal inspection of local voter registration. See id.
32. See id. at 682-84.
33. Filvaroff& Wolfinger, supra note 29, at 11.
34. Id. at 11-12. Birmingham made two important impacts: (1) the graphic images of
peaceful black demonstrators being brutally beaten heightened the public demand for civil
rights legislation; and (2) the presidential administration began to recognize that inaction
would be detrimental to the nation and also damaging to the 1964 election. Id. at 13; see also
David B. Oppenheimer, Kennedy, King, Shuttlesworth and Walker: The Events Leading to the
Introduction of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 29 U.S.F. L. REV. 645, 671 (1995).
35. See Filvaroff& Wolfinger, supra note 29, at 12.
36. Id. at 13.
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Both the administrations of John F. Kennedy and Lyndon B.
Johnson pioneered the Civil Rights Act of 1964. 37 President Kennedy
began the process of gaining support for the legislation in a nationally
38televised address on June 11, 1963. Kennedy urged Americans to
take action to guarantee equality in society. 39 He then submitted a civil
rights legislation proposal to Congress, and included language
intended to remedy the permeating segregation problems in places of
public accommodation including restaurants, lunch counters, hotels,
40
and theaters. The bill specifically aimed to remedy the widespread
discrimination against African-Americans in the South.4' On July 2,
1964, one year after Kennedy's submission to Congress, President
42Johnson signed this bill as the Civil Rights Act of 1964. In a
nationally televised address, Johnson declared:
We believe that all men are created equal. Yet many are
denied equal treatment. We believe that all men have
certain unalienable rights. Yet many Americans do not
enjoy those rights .... We can understand-without
rancor or hatred-how all this happened. But it cannot
continue. Our Constitution, the foundation of our
Republic, forbids it. The principles of our freedom
forbid it. Morality forbids it. And the law I will sign
tonight forbids it.
43
The trumping argument was that without action to create new legal
remedies, demonstrations would continue to spread throughout the South
and into the North; the country would be tom by widespread civil
disruption if not outright racial violence. The president and his party
would be blamed. Such a climate would be as disastrous as an economic
depression for Kennedy's prospects for re-election. In order to avoid
widespread violence, the president had to make a serious attempt to deal
with the demonstrators' grievances.
Id.
37. Kennedy, supra note 29, at 159.
38. See President John F. Kennedy, Television Address on Civil Rights, June 11, 1963,
in CIVIL RIGHTS SINCE 1787: A READER ON THE BLACK STRUGGLE 490 (Jonathan Birnbaum &
Clarence Taylor eds., 2000).
39. Id. at 490-91.
40. See Filvaroff& Wolfinger, supra note 29, at 12-13.
41. Id. at 29.
42. Id. at 26; see also Oppenheimer, supra note 34, at 645; Robert Pear, Civil Rights Act
is Assessed as 'Modest'Step, N.Y. TIMES, July 1, 1984, at A 15.
43. President Lyndon B. Johnson, Radio and Television Remarks Upon Signing the Civil
Rights Bill, July 2, 1964, http://www.lbjlib.utexas.edu/johnson/archives.hom/speeches.hom/
640702.asp.
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This Civil Rights Act was a monumental achievement and
legislative landmark in the Civil Rights Movement. 4 It vindicated the
deprivation of personal dignity, promoted equal access in public
establishments, and improved the quality of life for many African-
Americans and other minority groups throughout the United States.45
C. Establishing the Constitutionality and Purpose of Title II in Heart
of Atlanta Motel
In Heart of Atlanta Motel v. United States, the United States
Supreme Court established Title II as a constitutionally valid means of
desegregating places of public accommodation.46 The Court explained
that the constitutional support for Title II came from the Commerce
Clause of the United States Constitution, which empowers Congress to
"regulate Commerce with foreign Nations, and among the several
States, and with the Indian Tribes .... In essence, Title II forbids
racial discrimination in places of 4 public accommodation if its
operations affect interstate commerce.
In Heart of Atlanta Motel, a motel was charged with violating
Title II for its refusal to serve African-American customers. 49 The
motel operator challenged the constitutionality of the Act, alleging that
Congress exceeded its Commerce Clause powers by depriving motels
of the right to choose their customers.5 ° The Supreme Court
disagreed. Writing for the majority, Justice Clark explained that "the
action of the Congress in the adoption of the Act as applied here to a
motel which concededly serves interstate travelers is within the power
granted it by the Commerce Clause of the Constitution, as interpreted
by this Court for 140 years. 52 Justice Clark specified that Title II is
limited to places having "a direct and substantial relation to the
interstate flow of goods and people" and, therefore, such places have
no right to select guests as they choose because it would negatively
affect interstate commerce. 53 Heart of Atlanta Motel was a pivotal case
44. See Oppenheimer, supra note 34, at 645.
45. See Sandra J. Colhour, Note, Title II of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and Membership
Organizations Unconnected to a Physical Facility, 59 Mo. L. REV. 807, 816 (1994).
46. Heart of Atlanta Motel v. United States, 379 U.S. 241, 257, 261 (1964).
47. Kennedy, supra note 29, at 159; see also U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8, ct. 3.
48. 42 U.S.C. § 2000a(c) (2006).
49. See Heart of Atlanta Motel, 379 U.S. at 243.
50. Id. at 243-44.
51. Id. at258-62.
52. Id. at 261.
53. Id. at 250-51.
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that both explained the reasoning behind Title II and also proclaimed
the intolerability of racial discrimination that disrupted interstate
commerce.
54
D. Interpreting a "Place of Public Accommodation"
Cases arising after Heart of Atlanta Motel dealt primarily with
determining the applicability of Title II to certain types of places rather
than its constitutionality. The most famous case to address the
applicability issue was Daniel v. Paul,55 in which the United States
Supreme Court established the precedent for broadly applying Title II
to various places of public accommodation. 56 Shortly after the Daniel
decision, the Fourth Circuit was more receptive to following precedent
than in later years.57 However, unlike the Fourth Circuit, the Fifth
Circuit has consistently interpreted Title II to include establishments
not expressly mentioned in the text. 58 Other federal courts have
similarly maintained a more liberal reading of Title II and the places to
which it applies.
59
1. The United States Supreme Court's Broad Interpretation
In Daniel v. Paul,60  the United States Supreme Court
established precedent for interpreting the general scope and
applicability of Title 11.61 In this case, a group of African-Americans
brought a class action suit against a recreational facility after they were
denied access to the facility.6 2 The class alleged that the discrimination
54. But see id. at 279-80 (Douglas, J., concurring) (arguing that the decision should not
have been solely based on the Commerce Clause because racism was more a human rights
issue rather than an issue of the shipping of goods across interstate lines).
55. Daniel v. Paul, 395 U.S. 298 (1969).
56. See id. at 307-08; infra Part II.D.1.
57. See infra Part II.D.2; see also United States v. Cent. Carolina Bank & Trust Co., 431
F.2d 972, 974 (4th Cir. 1970).
58. See infra Part II.D.3; see also Rousseve v. Shape Spa for Health and Beauty, Inc.,
516 F.2d 64, 67 (5th Cir. 1975). See generally Miller v. Amusement Enter., Inc., 394 F.2d 342
(5th Cir. 1968).
59. See infra Part II.D.4. Denny v. Elizabeth Arden Salons, Inc. was a case of first
impression for the Fourth Circuit because it was the first time the court had tackled the issue
of whether a beauty salon or similar place of beauty constituted "a place of public
accommodation" under the statute. See generally Denny v. Elizabeth Arden Salons, Inc., 456
F.3d 427 (4th Cir. 2006).
60. 395 U.S. 298 (1969).
61. See id. at 307-08.
62. Id. at 300.
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was illegal because the recreational facility was protected under Title
II.63 The recreational facility offered swimming, boating, sunbathing,
picnicking, miniature golf, dancing facilities, and a snack bar. 64 The
Court held that the entire recreational facility was subject to Title II
protection as a place of entertainment because the facility's snack bar
qualified as a covered establishment under Title 1I.
65
The Court based its decision on three findings. 66 Writing for
the majority, Justice Brennan first found that the snack bar was
"principally engaged in selling food for consumption on the
premises. He explained that an establishment "is a covered public
accommodation if it 'serves or offers to serve interstate travelers or [if]
a substantial portion of the food which it serves.., has moved in
commerce."' 6 Second, Justice Brennan argued that since the facility
advertised to interstate travelers in a monthly magazine, newspaper,
and radio station broadcasts, the recreational facility offered to serve
out of state travelers. 69 Lastly, Justice Brennan found that a
"substantial portion" of the food served at the snack bar had traveled
through interstate commerce because most of it came from other
states.7°
Importantly, Justice Brennan continued his analysis by noting
that the places of public accommodation provision encompasses not
only the places of public accommodation that are enumerated in Title
II, but also includes a wide range of establishments that are not
explicitly named.7' Justice Brennan rejected respondents' argument
that Title II's "place of entertainment" provision refers only to
establishments where "patrons are entertained as spectators or
listeners" and found that Title II also implies "direct participation in
some sport or activity." 72 He explained instead that, although
Congress' discussion of Title II focused on "places of spectator
entertainment rather than recreational areas," its scope should be based
on Congress' greater goals of eliminating discrimination in places
63. Id.
64. Id. at 301.
65. Id. at 303-04.
66. Id. at 303-08.
67. Id. at 304.
68. Id.
69. Id.
70. Id. at 305.
71. Id. at 307-08.
72. Id. at 306.
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where the public engages in leisure activities.73 Finding support in the
Fifth Circuit's 1970 decision in Miller v. Amusement Enterprises,
Inc.,74  Justice Brennan argued that Congress intended for
"entertainment" to be read broadly, referring to a definition of the term
as "the act of diverting, amusing, or causing someone's time to pass
agreeably. . .. ,75 Using this broad interpretation of "entertainment,"
Brennan concluded that the recreational facility at issue was covered
under Title II and, therefore, that its discriminatory practices violated
76the 1964 Act. By looking to the statute's overriding purpose as the
guide for judicial interpretation, the Daniel decision established the
appropriate method for interpreting Title II and its provisions. 77
2. The Fourth Circuit's Early Inclusive View
In 1970, the Fourth Circuit maintained an unrestricted view
regarding the definition of a "place of entertainment" under Title 11. 78
In United States v. Central Carolina Bank and Trust Company, the
Attorney General brought an action against a North Carolina golf
course and pro shop that excluded African-Americans from patronage,
arguing that the facility qualified as a "place of entertainment" under
Title II of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. 79 The court explained that
"[p]laces of entertainment affect commerce only if their 'sources of
entertainment' move in commerce.' 80 Because a majority of the pro
shop's equipment and golf carts were manufactured outside the state,
the Fourth Circuit held that the eolf course and the pro shop were
engaging in interstate commerce. Therefore, following the reasoning
in Daniel, the Fourth Circuit determined that the golf course and pro
73. Id. at 307-08. Justice Brennan argued that the scope should be focused on "the
primary objects of Congress' concern when a natural reading of its language would call for
broader coverage." Id. at 307.
74. Miller v. Amusement Enter., Inc., 394 F.2d 342 (5th Cir. 1968) (finding that an
amusement park was a "place of entertainment" within the public accommodation provisions).
75. Daniel, 395 U.S. at 306 & n.7, 307-08. Justice Brennan focused on the larger
purpose of the statute to justify a broad interpretation. Id. at 307-08; see also Roessler, supra
note 26, at 1263.
76. Daniel, 395 U.S. at 307-08.
77. Roessler, supra note 26, at 1264.
78. See United States v. Cent. Carolina Bank & Trust Co., 431 F.2d 972, 974 (4th Cir.
1970).
79. Id.
80. Id. at 975 n.5.
81. Id. at 974. "If the products and services provided by the pro shop are 'sources of
entertainment which move in commerce,' Hillandale [the golf course] is a covered
establishment and is subject to the Act's requirement of non-discrimination. Under Daniel v.
Paul, there can be little question but that they are." Id. (internal citations omitted).
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shop together constituted a "place of entertainment" and were subject
to the provisions of Title 11.12
3. The Fifth Circuit's Broad Viewpoint
Unlike the Fourth Circuit whose Title II approach has changed
over time, the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit has consistently
applied a broad and liberal approach to interpreting Title II. 83 One year
prior to the Daniel decision, the Fifth Circuit interpreted Title II in the
landmark 1968 decision Miller v. Amusement Enterprises, Inc. 84
In Miller, an African-American plaintiff brought an action
under Title II against an amusement park that denied African-
Americans access. 5 The Fifth Circuit found the amusement park to be
a place of public accommodation under Title I-particularly, "a place
of entertainment"--because of its general purpose to entertain,
combined with its numerous direct and indirect contacts with interstate
commerce. 86 Specifically, the court considered the amusement park a
"place of entertainment" because it had eleven major mechanical rides,
an ice skating rink, and a small concession stand; furthermore, the
court found that it had engaged in interstate commerce because it had
advertised its business over the radio and television to the public.87
The Fifth Circuit held that "any establishment which presents a
performance for the amusement or interest of a viewing public would
be included" under Title 11.88 In its decision, the Fifth Circuit
articulated the proposition later discussed and clarified in Daniel that
the legislature did not intend for Title II to be narrowly construed.89
The court explained that if Congress meant to confine the span of
covered establishments, it would have used exclusive, instead of
inclusive, language about what constitutes a covered establishment. 90
82. Id.
83. See generally Miller v. Amusement Enter., Inc., 394 F.2d 342 (5th Cir. 1968)
(holding that an amusement park was a "place of entertainment" under the public
accommodations provision of the 1964 Act); Rousseve v. Shape Spa for Health and Beauty,
Inc., 516 F.2d 64 (5th Cir. 1975) (holding that a women's health spa was a "place of
entertainment" under the public accommodations provision of the 1964 Act).
84. 394 F.2d 342.
85. Id. at 345.
86. Id. at 348-49.
87. Id. at 351.
88. Id. at 348.
89. Id.
90. Id. at 350-51. Specifically, the court argued that if Congress intended for a limited
reading of the statute it would have "concluded such section with the phrase 'and other places
2008]
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As one of the first cases to discuss recreational facilities as falling
under Title II, Miller laid the foundation for courts to use a broad
interpretation of Title II to include a particular establishment under the
statute and thus end that establishment's practice of discrimination.
91
Seven years after Miller, the Fifth Circuit expanded the
definition of "entertainment" endorsed in both Daniel and Miller to
include a beauty and health spa in the case of Rousseve v. Shape Spa
for Health and Beauty, Inc.92 The court held that the "place of
entertainment" language of Title II should be read to include
recreational areas and spectator entertainment. 93 Since 9,000 to 12,000
members used the facility yearly, the facility was advertised on
television, in daily newspapers and over the telephone, and had
equipment that was manufactured outside of the state, the Fifth Circuit
concluded that the spa's operations affected commerce and that the
advertisements and programs were that of a "recreational nature." 94 In
its decision, the Fifth Circuit acknowledged that health and exercise
studios differ from the establishments at issue in Miller and Daniel,
but ultimately reasoned that the definition of the term "place of
entertainment" was not strained by their inclusion. 95 Miller and
Rousseve are strong examples of cases where the Fifth Circuit's
interpretation of Title II was based on Congress' overriding purpose of
eliminating discrimination in public places.
4. Other Federal Courts' Views
Other federal courts have interpreted the "place of public
accommodation" provision of Title II broadly and have specifically
considered the question of whether barbershops or beauty salons are
included., 97 In the 1965 case Pinkney v. Meloy,98 an African-American
patron sued a barber who refused to cut his hair in a hotel
of exhibition' rather than ending the section with the language 'or other place of exhibition or
entertainment."' Id. (emphasis in original).
91. See id. at 349.
92. Rousseve v. Shape Spa for Health and Beauty, Inc., 516 F.2d 64, 67 (5th Cir. 1975).
93. Id.
94. Id. at 66, 68.
95. Id. at 67.
96. See also United States v. DeRosier, 473 F.2d 749, 751 (5th Cir. 1973) (finding that a
neighborhood bar was a place of entertainment).
97. See generally Pinkney v. Meloy, 241 F. Supp. 943 (N.D. Fla. 1965); Halton v. Great
Clips, Inc., 94 F. Supp. 2d 856 (N.D. Ohio 2000).
98. 241 F. Supp. 943.
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barbershop. 99 The court decided that "[t]he location of the barbershop
within the physical premises of the hotel, a place of public
accommodation, and its holding itself out to patrons of the hotel being
within a place of accommodation places this defendant under the
coverage of the [1964] Act."' ' The court explained that the 1964 Act
does not cover all barbershops, but only those located "within the
physical premises or a place of public accommodation such as a hotel
or motel" and serves patrons of that hotel or motel. 10 The Pinkney
court based its holding on the location of the barbershop rather than
the barbershop's activities and operations. 02
In contrast, a federal district court in Ohio held in its 2000
decision, Halton v. Great Clips, Inc., that a hair salon located in a
shopping center did not qualify as a "place of public
accommodation."' The court reasoned that the facts were
distinguishable from Rousseve and concluded that a hair salon was not
a "place of entertainment" because the salon did not engage in any
recreational activities to bring it under the statute's broad definition of
entertainment. 1°4 In contrast to Pinkney, the court in Halton based itsholding on the salon's activities rather than its location.' 05
III. THE COURT'S REASONING
In Denny v. Elizabeth Arden Salons, Inc., the Court of Appeals
for the Fourth Circuit affirmed the district court's dismissal of the Title
II claim, holding that the salon did not constitute a "place of public
accommodation" as defined under Title 11.106 In writing the majority
opinion, Judge Wilkinson narrowly interpreted the statute's
language. 107 Circuit Judge King dissented in part from this opinion. 108
The court began its opinion by assessing whether Congress
intended for Title II to cover beauty salons. 0 9 The court explained
that, since the passing of the 1964 Act, no court has interpreted the
"place of entertainment" provision within the "place of public
99. Id. at 946.
100. Id. at 947.
101. Id.
102. See id.
103. Halton v. Great Clips, Inc., 94 F. Supp. 2d 856, 862 (N.D. Ohio 2000).
104. Id.
105. Id. at 862-64.
106. Denny v. Elizabeth Arden Salons, Inc., 456 F.3d 427, 429 (4th Cir. 2006).
107. Id. at 429-31.
108. Id. at 437.
109. Id. at431-32.
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accommodation" provision of Title II to include a beauty salon like the
one in Denny. 10 In following this line of reasoning, the court strictly
interpreted the statutory language and reasoned that Congress wrote
the statute to include only those establishments expressly named."' In
other words, the court reasoned that Congress would have listed a
beauty salon if it intended for its coverage; instead, the legislature
specifically chose not to cover places that provide salon services. 112 If
the legislature intended the term "place of entertainment" to cover
places with "tangential entertainment value," the court reasoned that
Congress would not have created separate establishment subsections in
the statute." 13 Moreover, the court contrasted Title II with the
Americans with Disabilities Act, in which Congress explicitly lists
beauty shops as places of public accommodation under the statute."
4
After noting that beauty salons were not explicitly mentioned
in the text of Title II, the court determined whether a beauty salon
bears any relation to those "places of entertainment" specifically listed
in the statute.1 15 In so doing, the court focused mainly on the salon's
operations. 116 Unlike a theater, concert hall, or sports arena-which
are designed to entertain their patrons in the traditional sense-the
court reasoned that the function of the salon in this case was
fundamentally different. 1 7 The court explained that the beauty salon
offered its customers hair, skin, and body care and, therefore, did not
equate to the experience of attending a movie, symphony or sports
match.1 8 The court further noted that the salon was "designed to
market high-quality hair, skin, and body care, not amusement." 19 The
court found that Title II's prohibition of racial discrimination does not
extend to "service establishment[s] with incidental relaxation
value."' 20 Despite the salon's stated purpose in rendering relaxation to
its customers, the court concluded that Congress had not intended for a
"place of entertainment" to encompass any service establishment that
provided "tangential entertainment," but instead was limited to
110. Id. at 432-33.
111. Id. at 432.
112. Id.
113. Id.; see 42 U.S.C. § 2000a(b) (2006).
114. Denny, 456 F.3d at 432.
115. Id. at 431-32.
116. Id.
117. Id.
118. Id. at 432.
119. Id. at 434.
120. Id. at 433 n.1.
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establishments enumerated in the statute or those closely related to
such establishments.'21
The court then looked to precedent and argued that no case has
found Title II to cover a salon like the one in Denny.122 Comparing the
facts of Denny with those in Daniel v. Paul and Rousseve v. Shape Spa
for Health and Beauty, Inc.-both of which concluded that
establishments not explicitly listed under Title II could qualify as
"places of entertainment"-the court found no similarities among the
cases.123 Specifically, the court reasoned that Denny and Daniel were
not analogous because the "body maintenance services with tangential
entertainment value" performed in the salon were not comparable to
the "amusement business" at issue in Daniel, where the amusement
park's purpose was to sell entertainment to its customers.1 24 Similarly,
the court differentiated the establishment in Denny from that in
Rousseve because the spa in Rousseve had recreational areas and
facilities including gymnasium equipment and swimming pools, while
the spa in Denny solely provided services for hair, skin, and nails and
did not have any additional recreational facilities. 125 The court further
explained that the services the salon offered in Denny were not
analogous to that of any of the establishments that previous courts
found as a "place of entertainment."'
126
Lastly, the court proclaimed the issue of whether the scope of
Title II includes beauty salons and barbershops as a matter of
legislative debate, reasoning that "[i]t remains our job to respect what
Congress has said, not to put words in its mouth." 2 7 As a result, the
court practiced judicial restraint and refused to read Title II as
covering the beauty salon.' 28 The majority concluded that Title II did
not provide the plaintiffs with protection from the salon's
discriminatory practices.' 
29
In a dissenting opinion, Judge King argued that the majority
erred in finding that the salon did not fall within the ambit of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964.130 Judge King identified two fatal errors in the
121. Id. at 432.
122. Id. at 433.
123. Id. at 432-33.
124. Id. at432.
125. Id. at 433.
126. Id. at432.
127. Id. at 434.
128. Id.
129. Id.
130. Id. at 437 (King, J., dissenting).
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majority's analysis. 131 First, he argued that the majority failed to
follow relevant precedent, including Daniel, and did not reasonably
interpret the statutory language of Title II. 132 Second, he explained that
the majority's reasoning relied on a "crucial factual misapprehension"
by categorizing the Red Door Salon and Spa as merely a hair salon.
133
Specifically, he argued that a salon's purpose is not just to provide
beauty services, but it is also to provide entertainment to its patrons.
134
Under Daniel's broad construction of the statute, he reasoned that the
salon qualifies as a place of public accommodation within the meaning
of Title II because of its purpose to provide entertainment.' 
35
IV. ANALYSIS
In Denny v. Elizabeth Arden Salons, Inc., the Court of Appeals
for the Fourth Circuit held that a beauty salon is not a "place of public
accommodation" under Title II of the Civil Rights Act of 1964."' In
so holding, the Fourth Circuit puts forth poor reasoning that ultimately
ignores over forty years of progress in the battle to gain equal access to
places of public accommodation. Specifically, the court makes a
flawed separation of powers argument to justify its narrow reading of37
Title II. In addition, the court takes a conservative approach towards
civil rights issues and fails to follow precedent by neglecting its earlier
willingness to read Title II inclusively.' 38 In other words, it considers
those establishments enumerated in Title II as the exclusive list of
places covered under the statute, therefore excluding beauty salons and
countless other establishments from the requirement to provide equal
access to places of public accommodation.139 Lastly, the Fourth
Circuit's decision ignores Congress' overriding purpose in enacting
Title II and takes a step backward in the fight for equal rights.140 The
Denny decision sends the message that racial discrimination is an
acceptable practice in most public places, or in other words, in places




134. Id. at 441 ("The name 'Elizabeth Arden Red Door Salon and Spa' implies a place
where patrons come to relax and divert from their everyday lives.").
135. Id.; see also discussion supra Part II.D.I.
136. Denny, 456 F.3d at 429.
137. See discussion infra Part IV.A.
138. See discussion infra Part IV.B.
139. See discussion infra Part IV.B.
140. See discussion infra Part IV.C.
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A. The Fourth Circuit Makes a Flawed Separation of Powers
Argument
In its decision, the Fourth Circuit emphasizes that the
judiciary's role is to follow closely the statutory language and not
interpret legislative intent because such interpretation would intrude
upon legislative powers. 14 1 The majority here follows this view and
determines the meaning of the 1964 Act by looking solely to its
explicit language. 142 However, the court's narrow interpretation of its
role distorts the theory of separation of powers. The court's fear of
overstepping its constitutionally mandated powers' 43 results in an
overly cautious and unreasonably narrow reading of Title II
prohibitions.
The United States Constitution created a federal government of
enumerated powers, where each governmental branch has distinct
functions that cannot be delegated to any of the other branches. 144 The
separation of powers theory is based on this idea of separate roles for
specific branches.145 It is generally understood that the legislature
drafts and executes laws, the executive enforces the laws, and the
judiciary interprets the laws. 14 6 The Founders believed that these
distinct functions would create a balance between the branches and a
self-regulating system of checks and balances. 147
The theory of separation of powers seeks to prevent the
"arbitrary government or tyranny which may arise from the
concentration of power" in one branch, and provides the government
branches with the power to fight off encroachment. 148 The theory
should not be misunderstood as being a strict distribution of functions
between the three government branches; rather, the separation of
powers doctrine should be viewed as a network of rules and principles
that ensures that power is not concentrated in one branch of
government. 149 However, the Constitution contains no provision
expressly declaring that the powers of the three government branches
141. Denny, 456 F.3d at 434 ("We note ... that we have interpreted the statute as it does
read, not perhaps as it should read.").
142. Id.
143. See U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1.
144. See supra note 143.
145. Eric Barendt, Separation of Powers and Constitutional Government, in THE RULE OF




149. Id. at 284.
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be separated. 150 Rather, the separation of powers theory was thought to
be implicit in the government structure under the U.S. Constitution. 151
In Denny, the Fourth Circuit views its judicial powers as a
strict function rather than as part of an intertwining network with the
legislature. 152 The court's strict and narrow understanding of its
constitutional powers leads to a strict and narrow reading of Title 11.153
Contrary to the court's view, a broader interpretation of Title II would
not have led to government tyranny, but instead would have been a
proper check on the legislature in the scheme of a self-correcting
government. 154 Tyranny generally occurs from violating the separation
of powers doctrine, not when the separate powers are balanced and
work in harmony as an intertwining network. 155 The Denny case does
not present an opportunity for the judiciary to usurp legislative control;
instead, it presents an opportunity for the judiciary to perform its most
basic function: to interpret a statute. Even if the court interpreted the
statute liberally, the basic tenants of federalism would have remained
intact, two African-American plaintiffs would have received the
justice they deserve and, most importantly, the court would have made
a clear statement regarding the intolerability of discrimination.
The Fourth Circuit seeks to remain faithful to Congress' words
and legislative intent with respect to the covered establishments under
Title II. Often, examining the text of a statute best determines
legislative intent. However, the plain text of Title II is ambiguous as to
whether the legislature intended for establishments such as beauty
salons-which resemble some of the enumerated establishments
covered under Title II-to be included under the statute. 156 One
interpretation of this ambiguity is that Congress intended for a broad
interpretation of the statute. 157 The United States Supreme Court in
150. See id.
151. Id. at 275-78; see Clinton v. Jones, 520 U.S. 681, 699 (1997) ("The doctrine of
separation of powers is concerned with the allocation of official power among the three
coequal branches of our Government."); see also Mistretta v. U.S., 488 U.S. 361, 380-81
(1989) (finding that the lines between the three branches of government are unclear at times).
152. See Denny v. Elizabeth Arden Salons, Inc., 456 F.3d 427, 434 (4th Cir. 2006).
153. See id.
154. See generally United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995) (confirming the purpose
of the separation of powers doctrine).
155. See Barendt, supra note 145, at 278-79.
156. See generally Colhour, supra note 45 (discussing the question of congressional
intent and the application of Title II to entities that do not clearly resemble those explicitly
listed in the statute). See also Rodriguez & Weingast, supra note 20, at 1537-38
(acknowledging that the legislative history of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 is confusing and
difficult to assess in statutory interpretation).
157. See Colhour, supra note 45, at 817.
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Daniel v. Paul adopts this precise view. 158 In Daniel, the Court
interpreted the phrase "or other places of exhibition or entertainment"
as incorporating other establishments that are not expressly listed, but
closely resemble the listed places. 159 Although a beauty salon is not a
large public venue like those listed in Title II, it resembles those places
because individuals visit a beauty salon not only to obtain beauty
services, but also to gossip, congregate, interact, listen to music, watch
television, and relax. In other words, a beauty salon-like a movie
theater or concert hall-allows an individual to enjoy himself and be
entertained. 160 Given this understanding of a beauty salon, it is not
unreasonable to expect that Title II would include such an
establishment.
In short, the court possesses the power to decide the breadth
and power of Title II. Within its constitutionally mandated power, the
Fourth Circuit could have expanded the scope of Title II to include
beauty salons. Unfortunately, under the guise of separation of powers,
the Fourth Circuit interprets Title II incredibly narrowly and, as a
result, refuses to adequately exercise its judicial power.
B. The Fourth Circuit Did Not Follow Relevant Precedent
The Fourth Circuit's decision ignores the precedent established
in Daniel v. Paul16 1 and undermines the United States Supreme
Court's commitment to equality. 162 The Supreme Court in Daniel
concluded that a recreational facility fell under Title II based on one
aspect of the facility-the snack bar-which it found affected
commerce in its food service and advertisements.' 63 In contrast, the
Fourth Circuit in Denny does not consider in its analysis whether the
beauty salon influenced interstate commerce, despite the fact that a
facility's involvement in interstate commerce is a cornerstone in any
Title I analysis because of the statute's reliance on the Commerce
Clause. 164 Undeniably, a beauty salon-especially a nationwide chain
such as Elizabeth Arden Red Door Spas-engages in interstate
commerce when servicing out-of-state customers, advertising outside
158. See discussion supra Part II.D.1.
159. See discussion supra Part II.D.1.
160. See Daniel v. Paul, 395 U.S. 298, 306 n.7 (1969) (The Supreme Court referred to a
definition of "entertainment" that defined the term as "the act of diverting, amusing, or
causing someone's time to pass agreeably: [synonymous with] amusement.")
161. Id. at 307-08.
162. See discussion supra Part II.D. 1.
163. Daniel, 395 U.S. at 305.
164. See id. at 303-04; see also 42 U.S.C. § 2000a(c) (2006).
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the state, and buying and selling beauty products shipped across state
lines. 165 Although neither the facts nor the court's decision in Denny
discuss these details, the particular beauty salon at issue in this case
more than likely engaged in these interstate commercial activities.'
66
Furthermore, the facts demonstrate that the salon serves food to
its patrons: Jean Denny was eating lunch that the salon provided when
the alleged altercation occurred. 167 Surely the lunch included food that
was shipped across state lines, thus relating the service to interstate
commerce. The salon likely engaged in interstate commerce through
the advertisement and sale of its products and certainly through the
food services it provided to its patrons, which in the past has been a
clear indicator of interstate commerce.' 68 Indeed, Daniel only relied on
one aspect of the establishment to find that it was covered. 169 These
several indications of interstate commerce surely bring the salon in
Denny under Title II. Moreover, in Rousseve, the Fifth Circuit found
that a beauty salon that affects interstate commerce and has programs
of a "recreational nature" is specifically the type of establishment that
the drafters of Title II intended to protect. 1
70
Unlike the recreational activities in Rousseve and Daniel, the
salon's operations in Denny were not of a "recreational nature" in the
traditional sense. 17 1 However, although the Court in Daniel did
consider the recreational nature of the establishment, it looked mainly
at the establishment's dealings in interstate commerce to determine if
it was a "place of entertainment" under Title 1I. 172 In contrast, the
Fourth Circuit in Denny focuses its analysis solely on whether the
salon's services were of a recreational, entertainment-based nature,
and completely failed to follow Supreme Court precedent when it
avoided any analysis of the salon's dealings in interstate commerce.'
1 73
165. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000a(c) (2006).
166. See Elizabeth Arden Red Door Spas, http://www.reddoorspas.com/AboutUs.aspx
(last visited Nov. 16, 2008). Elizabeth Arden Spas, LLC is the owner and operator of full
service salons and day spas with thirty day spas and resort locations nationwide. Id.
167. See Denny v. Elizabeth Arden Salons, Inc. 456 F.3d 427, 430 (4th Cir. 2006).
168. See e.g., Daniel, 395 U.S. at 305.
169. See supra note 163 and accompanying text.
170. See supra notes 93-94 and accompanying text.
171. Compare Denny, 456 F.3d at 429 (recreational activities included hair, skin, nail,
and body treatments) with Daniel, 395 U.S. at 301 (recreational activities included swimming,
boating, miniature golf, dancing, and a snack bar) and Rousseve v. Shape Spa for Health and
Beauty, Inc., 516 F.2d 64, 67 (5th Cir. 1975) (recreational activities included physical exercise
facilities, swimming pools, and body massages and facials).
172. See discussion supra Part II.D. I.
173. See discussion supra Part III.
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Moreover, the Denny court was not willing to follow its own
Circuit's precedent in Central Carolina Bank and Trust Company,
174
where the court found that a golf course and pro shop constituted a
"place of entertainment" because its equipment and sources were
products of interstate commerce.' 75 The court in Denny, in contrast,
looks only at whether the salon's operations were similar to other
places of entertainment instead of determining whether the salon's
advertising efforts or its sources of equipment had an effect on
interstate commerce. 176 In doing so, the Fourth Circuit neglects to
consider other aspects of the salon that could have qualified it as a
"place of entertainment."'1 77
In analyzing the salon's operations, the Fourth Circuit does not
engage in a thorough Title II assessment and certainly does not follow
binding precedent, or even strongly persuasive authority. The Fourth
Circuit fails to adequately justify the rationale behind its decision.
Particularly, the court neglects to give an explanation as to why it did
not follow the clear precedent on this issue. It neither offers a
definition of the word "entertainment" nor introduces supporting case
law. In sum, the Denny court unnecessarily and inappropriately limits
its analysis and statutory interpretation, and fails to adequately support
its theory that a beauty salon does not qualify for Title II coverage.
C. The Fourth Circuit's Decision Defeats the Original Overriding
Purpose of Title II
By disregarding precedent, the Fourth Circuit under-enforces
Title II and fails to embrace its original spirit. Although Heart of
Atlanta Motel established the statute's function to eliminate
discrimination in places having an effect on interstate commerce, the
drafters of Title II aimed to abolish racial distinctions and blatant
discrimination and to promote social equality.' 78 Specifically, the
statute was designed to eradicate "the deprivation of personal dignity
174. United States v. Cent. Carolina Bank & Trust Co., 431 F.2d 972 (4th Cir. 1970); see
also discussion supra Part II.D.2.
175. See Cent. Carolina Bank & Trust Co., 431 F.2d at 974.
176. See Denny, 456 F.3d at 431-32 (arguing that a salon is not the same as a sports
stadium, movie theater, or symphony).
177. For example, the Fourth Circuit did not consider the location of the salon as have
other federal courts. See, e.g., Pinkney v. Meloy, 241 F. Supp. 943, 947 (N.D. Fla. 1965);
Halton v. Great Clips, Inc., 94 F. Supp. 2d 856, 863 (N.D. Ohio 2000).
178. See supra note 29 and accompanying text; see also Stephen E. Haydon, A Measure
of Our Progress: Testing for Race Discrimination in Public Accommodations, 44 UCLA L.
REv. 1207, 1211 (1997).
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that surely accompanies denials of equal access to public
establishments."' 79 In its analysis, however, the Fourth Circuit
considers neither the statute's purpose nor its legislative history.
Instead, the Fourth Circuit bases its decisions on a plain reading of the
statute's text. 18 In neglecting to consider the original intent of Title II,
the Fourth Circuit compromises the statute's authority. Denny does not
consider the guiding principle established in Daniel that proclaimed
the statute's overarching purpose, rather than the text alone, as the
guide for judicial interpretation.' In doing so, the Denny court
ignores decades of civil rights efforts seeking to entitle all individuals
to equal enjoyment and services in public facilities. 182
The Fourth Circuit's decision stunts the positive progress of the
civil rights movement, regressing to earlier racist perspectives.
183
Courts possess the power to interpret statutes and case law in
whichever manner they see fit and, therefore, have the power to
change the status quo, for better or for worse. Looking at historical
landmark Supreme Court decisions concerning civil rights, it is clear
that court decisions can significantly influence the mindset of the
majority in our society. 184 The Denny court's decision does not mirror
the generally progressive mindset of our society concerning racial
discrimination and may signify a negative turn against all the progress
that has been made over the past forty-five years.
At the time of the enactment of the Civil Rights Act of 1964,
theaters, lunch counters, hotels, schools, and public restrooms were the
places where segregation was at issue.' 85 Congress, therefore, enacted
a statute that addressed segregation in places where it was most
prevalent. 186 Certainly, Congress did not intend to allow or promote
179. See Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States, 379 U.S. 241, 291-92 (1964)
(Goldberg, J., concurring).
180. See Denny, 456 F.3d at 431.
181. Id., see also Daniel v. Paul, 395 U.S. 298, 308 (1969).
182. See e.g., Sarah Martinez, Note, Justice for None: the Fourth Circuit's Decision in
Denny v. Elizabeth Arden Salons, Inc. Undermines the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 10 SCHOLAR
21, 24, 36-38 (2007) (arguing that the Fourth Circuit's narrow interpretation in the Denny
decision constricts the overarching remedial purpose of the 1964 Act).
183. See generally Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. 393 (1856) (holding that African
slaves could never be United States citizens); Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896)
(mandating "separate, but equal" treatment); Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3 (1883) (holding
that the Constitution does not grant Congress the authority to prohibit private discrimination in
public accommodations).
184. See generally Dred Scott, 60 U.S. 393; Plessy, 163 U.S. 537; Civil Rights Cases,
109 U.S. 3.
185. See Oppenheimer, supra note 38, at 648 & n.9 (describing the segregated public
facilities that motivated Title II).
186. Id. at671-72.
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racial discrimination in places that were not listed in the statute. 187
Rather, the drafters of Title II intended for the law to progress with and
adapt to changes in society because they realized that it would be
impossible to anticipate later-emerging public establishments where
discrimination might become an issue. For example, Congress passed
the Civil Rights Act in an era where computers were just being
invented and the Internet did not yet exist. 188 Because the Internet did
not exist at the time of the statute's enactment, Congress could not
have contemplated the Internet as a place in need of regulation to
prevent discrimination. 189 The same argument applies for beauty
salons since they were not places where discrimination was most
prevalent at the time, even though, unlike the Internet, beauty salons
were in existence.190 To adapt to the changing times, the Denny court
should have read Title II to include beauty salons. Certainly, the
drafters of Title II intended for the broad categories explicitly listed to
be inclusive of new emerging places of public accommodations.
Congress hardly meant for the statute to be amended repeatedly.
The Denny decision indicates that a small proportion of
individuals in the judicial system aim to return to our country's
racially divided past. The fact that this view remains present in our
federal courts is alarming. Had the court simply followed precedent
and recognized the overarching purpose of Title II, the court could
have promoted justice and made another step in the fight for equal
rights. Instead, the court made a decision that harkens back to the days
of segregated restrooms, schools, lunch counters, and buses. 19' This
social paradigm was considered a shadow of the past until the Denny
court issued its ruling.
187. See supra note 89 and accompanying text; see also 42 U.S.C. § 2000a (2006)
(prohibiting discrimination or segregation in places of public accommodation).
188. See Tara E. Thompson, Locating Discrimination: Interactive Web Sites as Public
Accommodations Under Title II of the Civil Rights Act, 2002 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 409, 410-11,
435 (2002) (arguing that intemet sites, such as chat rooms and bulletin boards, qualify as
public accommodations under Title II despite the fact that they are not explicitly listed in the
statute).
189. See id.
190. See generally Ingrid Banks, For Blacks Only?: The Continuing Significance of Race
in Post-Civil Rights Black Beauty Salon Culture (2006), http://www.allacademic.com/meta/
p104101_index.html (last visited Nov. 16, 2008). Separate beauty salons for African-
Americans and Caucasians were a product of de facto segregation. Id. at 1, 3.
191. See discussion supra Part II.A-B.
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V. CONCLUSION
In Denny v. Elizabeth Arden Salons, Inc., the Fourth Circuit
constrains the scope of the "place of entertainment" category under
Title II and deemphasizes the importance of the statute's original
overriding purpose. 192 The court's decision, in turn, narrows Title II
protections, making racial minorities more susceptible to
discrimination in places not explicitly listed in the statute, such as
beauty salons. The Fourth Circuit's argument that Congress would
have included a beauty salon if it intended for its coverage is without
merit. To expect Congress to amend Title II to include every potential
place of public accommodation is unreasonable.
Forty-five years after the passing of the Civil Rights Act of
1964, racial discrimination continues to present a problem in the
United States even though it may not be as blatant as it was at the time
of Title II's enactment. Discrimination is not any more acceptable in a
beauty salon than it would be in a hotel, theater, or restaurant. The
Fourth Circuit failed to utilize its judicial power to interpret Title II in
a way that would promote positive political and social change and,
thus, failed to fulfill the promise of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.1'
Certainly, if courts continue to follow the Fourth Circuit's lead in
interpreting Title II, then racial minorities will continue to be deprived
of the equal access and justice that the statute sought to provide in
places of public accommodation.
Denny demonstrates that discrimination is still alive and well in
our country, despite the progress that has been made since the
enactment of Title II. The passage of federal legislation alone does not
guarantee its enforcement; courts still have the responsibility to ensure
that the statute remains enforced. Therefore, to prevent another
discriminatory judicial outcome in our federal courts, the United States
Supreme Court should grant certiorari, reverse the Fourth Circuit's
holding, and declare the beauty salon a place of public accommodation
covered under Title II.
192. See discussion supra Part IV.
193. See discussion supra Part IV.C.
